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Abstract
Globalization skeptics argue that trade liberalization has high social costs, in-
cluding an increase in expropriative behavior such as civil-conict, coercion of labor
and crime. We show that a theoretical relationship between trade and expropria-
tion exists, but the sign diers for developed and developing economies. We verify
this empirically using data on crime rates. Specically we nd trade liberalization,
as measured by both higher openness and lower import duty rates, tends to increase
burglaries and theft in very labor abundant countries. For other countries, how-
ever, we nd that trade liberalization has either a small negative eect on crime,
or no eect, depending on the country's capital abundance.
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1 Introduction
There is a long history of economic thought that expresses scepticism over the benets of
trade liberalization on non-economic grounds (Irwin 1996, Findlay and O'Rourke 2007).
This scepticism extends to the contemporary globalization debate where some authors
such as Rodrik (1997) have suggested that the economic gains from trade might be dom-
inated by other considerations such as crime and social conict.1 In particular, in an
environment where law enforcement is imperfect or costly, agents can engage in expro-
priation or predation rather than production. Recent studies by Ghosh and Robertson
(2012), Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) and Dube and Vargas (2011) show that the impact
of trade on expropriation may be positive or negative depending on whether a country
is labor or capital abundant. These papers thus raise interesting, but un-tested, propo-
sitions regarding the eects of trade liberalization on crime. In particular they suggest
that possibility that the eects of trade liberalization on expropriative activity will dier
between developed and developing economies.2
The aim of this paper is to explore this relationship theoretically and empirically using
international data on crime rates. Crime is perhaps the most pervasive form of expro-
priation and there is an extensive literature on the economics of crime following Becker
(1968) and Ehrlich (1973). In particular Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004) have em-
phasized the importance of law enforcement activities, as well as economic activity, and
inequality in explaining crime trends. Likewise there is an extensive literature on how
trade aects wages and inequality. Nevertheless the link between trade liberalization and
crime, and whether it diers across the development spectrum, has not been explored in
the literature.3
Perhaps the body of work closest to our own is the recent literature on external shocks
and economic conict, such as Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), Collier and Ho-
eer (2004), Besley and Persson (2008), Bruckner and Ciccone (2010), and Dube and
Vargas (2011). These studies seek to identify the determinants of conict and civil war.
Across these studies there is a relatively robust nding that changes in external prices
1See also Deardor (2000), Wolf (2004) and Bhagwati (2004) for overviews of the globalization debate.
2Other models that look at similar issues, including predation, include Anderson and Marcouiller
(2005), Anderson and Bandiera (2006), Dodson (2002) and Demombynes and Ozler (2005). Similarly
Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009) consider the impact of openness on unemployment, allowing for the sign
to dier between capital and labor abundant countries.
3In particular an extensive literature exists on the determinants of crime across countries, focusing on
factors such as the rate of growth (Pyle and Deadman 1994, Cook 2010), unemployment rates (Bushway,
Cook and Phillips 2010), urbanization (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999, Fajnzylber, Lederman, Loayza,
Reuter, Roman and Gaviria 2000) and the level of development (Soares 2004).
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are associated with changes in conict, particularly in African countries.
Insofar as conict and crime are both types of expropriative activity, the present study
can be thought of as being complementary to this literature. Focusing on crime has an
advantage because of the extensive availability of comparable data relative to other forms
of expropriative activity such as civil-conict, coercion and piracy. Finally, as we illustrate
in our theoretical section, the economics of crime literature provides some interesting,
yet untested, propositions regarding the heterogeneous responsiveness of crime rates to
trade liberalization across countries depending on their labor abundance.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether trade liberalization has aected
the rates of crime. The empirical section test this proposition with respect to theft and
burglaries, using a panel data of 72 countries over the period 1980 to 2008. We nd
that trade liberalization increases crime rates in very labor abundant countries, but has
a statistically insignicant eect on crime for most countries with intermediate levels of
labor abundance. We also nd some evidence to suggest that trade liberalization may
reduce crime in very capital abundant countries.
The results hold for dierent specications of the model including dierent measures
of crime and trade liberalization. We also explore other related explanations such as
the role of institutions and the relationship between crime and inequality. Finally we
also control for endogeneity that may arise in two distinct forms. First we consider
the potential endogeneity of the trade variables policy variables by using instruments
lagged values and also the predicted value of openness, based on the geographic and
historical characteristics. In addition we consider the possibility, suggested in the crime
literature, that past crime rates may aect the current crime rate. We use an Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator to control for dierences in past crime rates. We nd consistent
support for our the hypothesis that trade liberalization increases crime rates in very labor
abundant countries; reduce crime in very capital abundant countries, but has little no
eect for countries with average capital abundance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, to motivate the empirical analysis, we
develop a simple model that shows how trade liberalization can aect expropriation. This
model is presented in Section 2, and is followed by a discussion of the data and empirical
strategy, including data reporting issues, in Section 3. The results are discussed in
Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 then investigates endogeneity issues and Section 7 concludes.
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2 A Model of Crime and Trade
Consider a small open economy with a unit measure of identical individuals.4 Each
individual has L units of labor and K units of capital, the returns (per unit) to which are
denoted by w and r respectively. There are two tradable goods, an exportable and an
importable denoted by x andm respectively. Let px and pm respectively denote the world
price of the exportable and importable. Choosing units appropriately for the two goods
we set pm = px = 1. We assume that the import-competing sector is tari protected and
let p ( > 1) denote the tari-inclusive price of the importable good faced by domestic
consumers.
Both x and m are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition
using labor and capital. Perfect competition in both these sectors imply that unit cost
equals price:
cx(w; r) = 1; (1)
cm(w; r) = p; (2)
where cx(w; r) and cm(w; r) denote the unit cost functions for x and m respectively.
Unlike the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework, we assume law enforcement is not per-
fect. As a consequence, in equilibrium, some resources will not be engaged in productive
activities. Each individual endowed with L units of labor and K units of capital faces an
eective choice between employing labor and capital in producing goods or services and
expropriating income from other agents.
2.1 Expropriation
We assume that, in their attempt to expropriate income, each individual can target only
one individual and can only be targeted by one individual. The probability of successfully
expropriating another individual's market income depends on the resources committed
to expropriation. Suppose individual i uses Lie units of labor and K
i
e units of capital in
expropriation. The production function for expropriation is e(Lie; K
i
e)  ei, where the






2 < 0; F 2 fL;Kg.
4This builds on recent papers by Ghosh and Robertson (2012) and Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) with a
view to providing a simpler, but also more accessible, statement of the relationship between the impact
of trade on crime at dierent levels of economic development.
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The unit cost function associated with this expropriation technology, which captures the
minimum income that an agent i has to forego to produce ei = 1, is then given by




e j ei = 1
	
: (3)
The value of ei determines the probability of i's success in expropriation. More speci-
cally, an agent i succeeds in expropriation with probability (ei) where (:) satises the
following properties: (i) (0) = 0, (ii) 0(ei) > 0; 00(ei) < 0, and (iii) (ei) < 1. The
rst two properties are standard. The third one says that there is a strictly positive
probability of failure of expropriation even if all resources are devoted to expropriation.
2.2 Law Enforcement Services
Individuals buy law enforcement services to reduce the probability of being expropriated.
Income from productive activities for an individual i is
!i  wLi + rKi.
where Li  L   Lie units of labor and Ki  K   Kie units of capital are engaged
in productive activities. A fraction  2 (0; 1) of this income is subject to potential
expropriation and hence the actual income from productive activities may be less than
!i. Nevertheless !i may also be realized if the act of expropriation is veried by a court.
We assume that each individual i buys zi( 0) units of law enforcement services, which
we think of as a bundle of security and legal services. Naturally, the higher the level of zi,
the higher the probability that the claim of expropriation by individual i is successfully
veried in the court. Let (zi) denote that probability which satises the following
plausible conditions: (i) (0) = 0, (ii) (zi) < 1 for all nite zi, and (iii) 0(zi) > 0,
00(zi) < 0. Let z  R 1
0
zidi denote the overall level of law enforcement services in the
economy. Like x and m, z is competitively produced under constant returns to scale.
The relevant pricing equation is
pz = cz(w; r); (4)
where cz(w; r) and pz respectively denote the unit cost function and the price of z.
5
5The existence of a market for z is not necessary for our results. Analogous to the contest/conict
literature we can think of zi as i's investment in protection of property, or endowments, which uses
both labor and capital. Unlike x and m, z is non-traded. For an alternative approach to modeling law
enforcement provision through voting see Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000).
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2.3 Income and Utility
The net potential income of i from productive sources is !i = wL + r K   ce(:)ei. As
explained above, a fraction of that income, !i, is subject to potential expropriation by
individual j. Similarly, an individual i attempts to expropriate !k from individual k.
Taking the probabilities of retaining those incomes into account (see Appendix A for
details) and deducting the expenditure on legal services, pzz
i, i's expected disposable
income can be expressed as
yid = !
i(1  (ej)(1  (zi))) + !k(ei)(1  (zk))  pzzi: (5)
Assume preferences are homothetic. Then we can write i's expected indirect utility V i
as v(p)yid where v(p) is decreasing in p.
2.4 Equilibrium
Each individual i chooses ei and zi to maximize V i  v(p)yid. We focus on symmetric
equilibrium where ei = e and zi = z for all i. Rearranging the rst-order conditions,
@V i
@ei
= 0 and @V
i
@zi











where s  (e)(1 (z)) denotes the expected share of income obtained though expro-
priation. Figure 1 below shows these two equations.
(Figure 1 about here)
The downward sloping curve EE depicts (6) which captures the optimal level of expro-
priation for a given level of z. As z increases, (i) expected income from expropriation
declines, and (ii) more income from productive activities is retained. Both (i) and (ii)
reduce incentives to engage in expropriation and consequently e declines.
The upward sloping curve ZZ depicts (7) which captures the relationship between the
demand for law enforcement and expropriation. There are two forces at work. First the
higher the level of expropriation the higher is the demand for legal services. This eect
suggests a positive relationship between e and z. There is a second less obvious eect
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however. A higher e implies a lower ! = wL+ r K   ce(:)e. Thus there is less income to
protect which reduces the marginal benet from legal services. The second eect suggests
that e and z might be negatively related. We assume that the rst eect dominates and
draw ZZ as an upward sloping line in (e; z) space.6 The intersection of EE and ZZ gives
equilibrium values (e; z).
2.5 Trade Liberalization
We represent trade liberalization as a fall in p { the price of the importable good. A fall
in p aects w
r
which in turn aects the opportunity cost of expropriation (ce), the price
of legal services (pz) and the income from productive activities (!). Consequently, trade
liberalization alters the equilibrium level of expropriation, e. However, as w
r
increases
in countries exporting labor-intensive goods and decreases in others, the eect of trade
liberalization on e can qualitatively dier across countries.
To x ideas, consider a developed country D that exports capital intensive goods and a
developing country G that exports labor intensive goods. Let K
D
LD




respectively denote the capital-labor ratio (in productive activities) in the developed and
the developing country. Also, let kiz and k
i
e respectively denote the equilibrium capital-
labor ratio in expropriation and the law enforcement sector of country i 2 fG;Dg.
Assume the following ranking {
maxfkDz ; kGz g < kG < kD < minfkDe ; kGe g
which says that (a) the developing country G is relatively labor-abundant and (b) the
law enforcement sector is relatively labor-intensive.
First consider the developing country G that exports a labor-intensive good. A fall
in p raises w
r
. Since expropriation is relatively capital-intensive (i.e. kG < kGe ), the
opportunity cost of crime relative to income from productive activities, ce
!
, decreases.
Incentives to expropriate increases and the downward sloping EE curve shifts right.
Similarly, since law enforcement is relatively labor-intensive, pz
!
increases with a fall in
p. Law enforcement becomes more costly which reduces the demand for z for a given
e. The upward sloping ZZ curve shifts right. As is clear from the Figure 2 below, e
increases in the developing country. Since a fall in p lowers w
r
in the developed country
D, the eect of trade liberalization on e is exactly opposite in the developed country D.
6Even if ZZ is downward sloping our arguments hold as long as ZZ is steeper than EE.
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(Figure 2 about here)
The ranking assumed above is not the only possible or the only plausible one. Also, the
assumed ranking is not necessary to get the results; e.g., e could be higher in the devel-
oping country G even if kGe < k
G. Thus the eect of trade liberalization on expropriation
is in general ambiguous and eectively an empirical question. Nonetheless, our theoreti-
cal framework helps in identifying the channels through which trade liberalization aects
expropriation. More importantly, it highlights the possibility for sign reversals between
developed and developing economies which nds support in the empirics.
3 Data
Illegal expropriation covers many activities from smuggling, coercion, through to vio-
lence, homicide and civil wars. To take the theory to the data we consider one well
dened element of expropriation for which comparable data is available across countries,
specically theft and burglaries. Our primary data source is the ocial crime data, as
reported to the authorities, from the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Opera-
tion of Criminal Justice (UNCS). This data-set oers a time span of nearly four decades
(1970-2008) and covers 156 countries.
Despite the relative consistency of this data, it is nevertheless recognized that ocial
crime data, like the UNCS, tend to suer from under-reporting. Ocial data are likely
to be particularly biased if there is a lack of trust in the authorities (Fajnzylber et
al. 2000), or if there is corruption within the judicial system (Bourguignon 1999).7
Hence the reporting rate is not expected to be constant across countries, nor across time,
but will depend on the country's changing characteristics (Gibson and Kim 2008). As
the reporting rate does not vary randomly across countries, ignoring this issue would
result in biased estimates.
A solution to this is to use victimization data, as reported in households surveys, a more
7A second problem is that some countries have modied their classication of crime over time (Mosher,
Miethe and Hart 2011, Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate 1995). Following Fajnzylber et al. (2000), the data
was scanned for such inconsistencies and observations that were clearly out of line, without a plausible
explanation, have been dropped. Given the arbitrary nature of this correction, all the models discussed
in this paper have been estimated using the corrected version of the data (results presented in this paper)
and using the original version of the data (results available on request). Both versions lead to similar
conclusions. A related problem is the inclusion of burglaries and automobile theft in the UNCS denition
of theft for some years but their separate recording in others. To ensure consistency our variable thefts
is inclusive of automobile theft, burglaries and other thefts. Finally, 5 year averages are taken so as to
smooth any large jumps in the data that might be caused by misreporting for a given year.
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accurate and consistent measure of crime rates across countries (Soares 2004). Such data
is, however, less widely available.
An alternative solution is to `correct' the ocial crime data using an estimated reporting
rate by calculating the reporting rate error, rrate. Specically, following Soares (2004),
let Y  be the log of the true crime rate and Y be the log of the ocial reported crime
rate, Y . Then the log of the reporting rate error is dened as ln(rrate) = Y   Y .
Now suppose that Y  is explained by the model
Y  = X + " (8)
where X is a matrix of country characteristics explaining the crime rate and " is an
independent and identically distributed error term.8
Then if we estimate the crime rate using the ocially reported crime rate data, Y , and
if the reporting rate varies across countries in a non random way, we will have
Y = X + "+ ' (9)
where '  ln(rrate) is the error resulting from misreporting. Assuming COV ('jX) 6= 0
then (9) will result in biased estimates for .
If, however, we believe that the victimization data report the true crime rate, Y , then
we can use this data to identify ' = Y   Y  for each country-year in which ocial crime
data and victimization data are available. Assuming further that the relation between
' and X is constant over time and countries, and that ' and X are jointly normally
distributed, we have
E ( j X) = X (10)
where  is a constant. We can then calculate an estimated true crime rate bY  for all
country-year observations for which we have data on the reported ocial crime rate and
the country's characteristics.9
8As discussed below in Section 4, the matrix of country characteristics we use is taken from Soares
(2004) and we include additional variables as well. The list of variables is given in Table 2 and dened
in Table A1. Further details are given below in Section 4 when discussing the empirical reporting rate
model, equation (11).
9Due to the presence of the corrected crime rate, the standard errors estimated by the OLS procedure
are biased. This however, aects only the variable used in the reporting rate model. For further discussion
see Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) and Soares (2004). A simpler way of correcting for non-random
dierences in reporting rate across countries is to include country xed eects as done by Fajnzylber et
9
Thus we consider a reporting rate regression to obtain estimates of the extent of under-
reporting of crime to the authorities. Specically, we use the UNCS in conjunction with
the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). This latter data-set covers 46 countries
over the period 1989 and 2005.10 The UNCS and the ICVS data overlap 107 times over
the period 1985-2008. Once the necessary explanatory variables are included, we are left
with a maximum overlap of 65 observations.
3.1 Reporting Rate Results
The reporting rate, rrate varies strongly across countries, from less than 1% to over 100%
with an average of 8% and 15% for thefts and burglaries respectively.11
In Table 2, we present the results for Soares (2004) model for both thefts' and burglaries'
log of the reporting rate using OLS.12 In columns 1 and 2, for thefts, and columns 4 and
5, for burglaries, we replicate Soares (2004) specications. We conclude, as Soares (2004)
does, that among this set of explanatory variables, only GDP per capita is consistently
statistically signicant.
There are however other potentially important explanatory variables not taken into ac-
count by Soares (2004) such as the quality of institutions, as suggested by Kaufmann,
Kraay and Zoido (1999) and ethnic fractionalization, a variable often associated with
crimes and conicts (Fafchamps and Moser 2003). We therefore consider including these
variables as determinants of the reporting rate. We also include dummy variables for the
major geographical areas, namely, Asia (asia), Latin America (latin) and Sub-Saharan
al. (2000). However, this technique will work only if the reporting rate is constant across time within
each country. This is unlikely to hold in long panels. Using country-year xed eects would resolve
this issue in principle. However, as we have only one observation per country-period, we cannot include
country-year xed eects.
10To compare the ICVS data to the UNCS data, we dene thefts as inclusive of car theft, theft from a
car, theft of a motorcycle, bicycle theft and theft of personal property, while burglaries includes burglaries
and theft from garages/sheds/lockups.
11As the victimization and the reported crime data come from dierent sources, the denition of
thefts and burglaries do not match perfectly between the two database. This results in the reporting
rate, rrate exceeding 100% for in a few instances in the burglaries data. To limit the extent of this
problem, we followed Soares (2004) suggestions to harmonize the denitions of the variables, though
small discrepancies may remain. The descriptive statistics summary for ln rrate are given in Table 1.
12In all models, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. The countries
included in the sample are listed in Appendix B.
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Africa (SSA). Hence we estimate
ln(rrate)it = 0 + 1 gdpit + 2 democi + 3 ethnici
+ 4 asiai + 5 latini + 6 SSAi + it (11)
where gdp is the log of per capita gross domestic product taken from the Penn World
Tables, democ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the country has been
a democracy for the whole period for which the data is available and zero otherwise
and ethnic is a measure of ethnic fractionalization taken from Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003). Based on the adjusted R-squared we use this
extended model (Columns 3 and 6) as our preferred specication. Thus, as in Soares
(2004), we conclude that GDP per capita has a positive impact on the reporting rate. In
the thefts' reporting rate model, we also conclude that a stable democracy increases the
reporting rate while ethnic diversity reduces it. The results also show that the reporting
rate for theft is signicantly lower in Asia and Latin America and signicantly higher in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Using the estimated reporting rates, we then proceed to correct the ocial reported
thefts' and burglaries' crime rates. As expected, the ocially reported crime rates vary
more than the \true", or corrected, crime rates, as shown by their respective standard
deviations (Table 1).
(Tables 1 and 2 about here)
4 Crime and Trade Liberalization
Having obtained corrected estimates of theft and burglary rates, we now turn to consider
the relationship between trade liberalization and crime, where crime is measured by either
theft or burglaries. Our theoretical model suggests that a change in trade policy regimes
will have an impact on crime, but that the sign of this eect is ambiguous. In particular
it depends on the sign of the Stolper-Samuelson eects which in turn depend on whether
a country is labor or capital abundant. We consider the following model,
ln (crimeit) = 0 + 1 ki + 2 tradeit + 3 (ki tradeit) + i Zi;t + "it (12)
where crime is measured either as thefts per 100,000 inhabitants or as burglaries per
100,000 inhabitants, adjusted for the reporting rate; trade is an indicator of the openness,
11
or restrictiveness, of the trade regime; and k is the log of the ratio of capital per worker
in 1970 to the average world capital per worker for the same year, and Zi;t is a vector of
additional explanatory variables. As high theft and burglary rates may impede capital
accumulation, leading the variable capital per labor to be endogenous, we use the capital
per labor ratio prevalent in 1970, 10 years before our rst observation.13
The key feature of (12) is the interaction between the log capital{labor ratio, k, and
trade.14 If a country's capital per worker is equal to the world average then ki = 0.
Hence 2 gives the impact of trade on the country with average capital abundance. Note
that this may well be zero according to the theory. For countries with ki above or below
the world average, k, the impact of trade on the crime rate is @crime=@trade = 2+3k.
To measure the trade regime, trade, we use two indices. The rst is the widely used
`openness' measure - the log of the ratio of trade over GDP (open). The second is the log
of the ratio of duties over imports (duties).15 The additional control variables include all
the variables in the reporting rate regression (log of GDP per capita, stable democracy,
ethnic fractionalization and the regional dummy variables) as well as: the growth rate
of GDP per capita (gdpg); population size and population size squared (pop and pop2 );
and, the unemployment rate (unemp). Further details of the data sources are given in
Appendix C and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
4.1 Base Model Estimation
For our base model we simply use a pooled clustered sandwich estimator to adjust for
time series correlation in the error terms within each country. The results from this base
model are presented in Table 3 (Column 1).16
First note that the coecient of open is insignicantly dierent from zero. As noted
above this implies that open has no impact on theft for countries with average capital
abundance, which is consistent with our theory. Examples of such countries are Costa
13As a robustness check we have used the contemporaneous value of the capital per labor ratio. The
main conclusions remain the same and are available on request.
14This follows for example similar specications used by Dutt et al. (2009) and Dutt and Mitra (2002)
in their empirical models of unemployment and protection.
15The ratio of trade over GDP is from the World Bank (2009) while the ratio of duties over imports is
from the WDI and the Historical Government Finance Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2005).
16While only the main variables of interest are presented in the core of this paper, the results for the
control variables are available in Appendix D. As a robustness check, the same model is estimated with
the standard errors corrected for autocorrelation of order one. The results are similar. The only notable
dierence is the loss of statistical signicance for the trade variable, as measured by duties, in the model
explaining burglaries (results available on request).
12
Rica, Morocco and Tunisia.
Next we note that that the impact of trade depends on the relative capital abundance,
as indicated by the negative and statistically signicant interaction term open k. Thus
open is associated with an increase in the theft rate in labor abundant countries, and a
decrease in the theft rate in capital abundant countries. Joint signicance tests for the
partial impact of trade, 2 + 3 k are also presented for values of the log of the capital
labor ratio, k =  4, k =  2 and k = 2. As can be seen in Figure 4, the values of -4 to 2
cover the sample distribution. Nevertheless it can also be seen that the distribution of k
is fairly even with signicant numbers of observations at these end points.
From the results in Table 3 (Column 1) it can be seen that the total impact of openness
is highly signicant and negative for capital abundant countries, k = 2, marginally
insignicant at moderately low levels of labor abundance, k =  2, and highly signicant
and positive for high level of labor abundance, k =  4. Thus, in relatively capital
abundant countries like Australia, Singapore and the United States, theft rates decrease
following a trade liberalization policy, while the opposite is true for labor abundant
countries like Uganda and Bangladesh.
A visual summary of this result is given in panel (i) of Figure 3. This shows the estimated
line @crime=@trade = 2 + 3 k. The dotted lines shows the 90% and 95% condence
intervals for all values of k, around the estimated line. From this gure we note that
over the sample range for k, the elasticity @crime=@trade varies from approximately
unity for the most labor abundant countries to approximately -0.5 for the most capital
abundant countries. Nevertheless it can also be seen that for a large range of countries,
from approximately k =  3 to k = 1, the impact of openness on crime is statistically
insignicant. Moreover as can be seen in Figure 4, this range of capital labor ratio
accounts for 71% of the countries for which the data exists in the Penn World Tables.
Hence the results suggest that, for most country/time observations, increasing openness
is unlikely to have any eect on theft. Nevertheless they also show that, for the most
labor abundant countries, openness tends to increase crime. Likewise, for the most capital
abundant countries, openness reduces crime. In terms of our theoretical model this result
is consistent with a scenario where crime prevention or law enforcement is a relatively
labor abundant activity in both developed and developing economies.
Figures 3 and 4 about here
13
4.2 Base Model Estimation for Alternative Variables
Thus far we have considered the result for estimating (12) using thefts as the dependent
variable and open as a measure of the trade policy regime. In addition we wish to consider
the model using data on burglaries as a dependent variable and duties as an alternative
measure of trade restrictiveness. This gives four dierent applications of equation (12).
The results for each of these additional implementations of (12) are given in column 1 of
Tables 4 to 6. These results are summarized in the remaining panels of Figure 3.
First consider using the rate of duties relative to imports (duties) as an alternative
measure of trade restrictiveness. Arguably this variable is a more reliable measure of
trade policy than openness. The cost, however, is a drop in the sample size from 240 to
155 observations as the variable duties is only available since 1990. Panel (ii) of Figure
3 shows that when we use duties, we obtain very similar results as the ones previously
discussed. As duties is a measure of trade restrictiveness the upward slope of the curve in
panel (ii) is consistent with the downward slope in panel (i). In this case, a 1% increase
in duties is shown to decrease crime in the most labor abundant countries (k=4) by 0.6%.
This eect becomes insignicant at the 5% level for countries in the range k = 0 and
above. Hence, in this case, we do not nd that higher levels of duties signicantly reduce
crime in the most developed countries, but the range of labor abundant countries where
trade policy does aect crime is widened. Broadly speaking however the results are quite
similar to the previous results in panel (i).
Next we consider the eect of trade on burglaries. A potential advantage of using data
on burglaries, which is dened as theft associated with breaking and entering a premise,
is that it is a more narrowly concept than theft and, hence, may be more consistently
dened across countries. This variable is however available for a shorter span of time,
1986-2008.
With open as the index of trade openness it can be seen, in Figure 3, panel (iii), that the
results are quite similar to the preceding thefts model in panel (i). Again there is a sign
reversal and the range of medium levels of k where the impact of crime is insignicant
is now reduced. Openness increases burglaries for values of approximately k <  1, and
reduces burglaries for countries with k > 1. Moreover the estimated elasticities at the
extremes are now much larger, ranging from approximately 3 to -1.5.
The results from estimating (12) for burglaries when duties is the trade restrictiveness
variable are reported in panel (iv) of Figure 3. It can be seen that these results are
again very similar to the preceding result for thefts and duties in panel (ii). Again the
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estimated range of elasticities is somewhat larger than when the theft data are used, and
the impact of duties on burglaries is just signicant at the 10% level for k = 2, whereas
it was insignicant in the thefts-duties case reported in panel (ii). There is a relatively
large range of values of k where @crime=@trade is insignicant, though in this case the
sample size is the smallest of all four cases.
It can be seen that across the four versions of (12) the results for @crime=@trade are very
consistent. They suggest that a more liberal trade regime is associated with higher crime
rates in labor abundant countries and that this eect declines and may reverse sign as we
consider more capital abundant counties. All models suggest larger coecients for labor
abundant countries, with smaller or possibly insignicant impacts for capital abundant
countries.17
(Figure 3 about here)
4.3 Economic Signicance
Finally note that, according to these results, the estimated impact of trade liberalization
on crime is economically signicant, though this depends very much on the individual
country characteristics { specically whether capital or labor abundant a country is
relative to the world average and whether trade liberalization increased or decreased.
By way of illustration, Table 7 reports the implied change in thefts for a selection of
countries. Specically it reports the results for countries where the predicted impact is
signicantly dierent from zero, and where we have enough panel data to compare the
predicted change with the actual change over the same period.18
It can be seen that for most countries thefts declined over time. Thus for some labor
17Alcala and Ciccone (2004) propose the use of \real openness", dened as the ratio of imports and
exports to PPP GDP for looking at the eects of productivity growth in the export sector on GDP
growth. This is because, with a non-tradable sector, a rising price of non-tradables may cause openness
to decline, since the value of non-tradables - which appears in the numerator - rises relative to tradables.
In this paper, however, we are not using openness as a measure of productivity in the export sector,
but simply as a measure of the level of protection. In a standard trade model with two goods, it is
straightforward to show that a tari ridden equilibrium will always have a lower level of openness than
the free trade equilibrium, since it reduces the value of exports and imports and raises national income
valued at domestic prices { due to the tari revenue eect. Hence, for our purposes, the standard
openness measure is appropriate. If we do use real openness, however, the results remain unchanged
for the burglaries model and there is some small loss of signicance for the thefts model, though the
interaction term remains signicant at the 10 percent level. These results are also available on request.
18For the purpose of this table we report all countries where the predicted eect, which depends on
the country's capital abundance, is signicant at the 10% level.
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abundant countries the eect of trade liberalization was opposite to the overall change in
crime. The magnitude of the predicted eect, however, suggests that the decline in crime
for some of these countries, such as Thailand, Bangladesh, and China, might have been
50 to 100% larger in the absence of the increase in openness. Conversely for Pakistan,
Indonesia, and Egypt where openness declined, it can been seen that our model predicts
that a signicant part of the net decline in thefts was due to trade.
Likewise for Switzerland, which is a capital abundant country, we see that the increase
in openness accounts for around 16 percentage points of the 47 percent decline in crime.
A similar pattern exists in the Netherlands. The predicted eects in Table 7 thus show
that the overall eects of openness on thefts tend to be large, but not unreasonably so
relative to the actual changes over time.
Table 8 provides similar evidence for the eects of openness on burglaries. Again, in
some cases openness, is seen to be osetting factor to the overall trend, while in a few
countries, such as Pakistan, Botswana and Switzerland, the predicted impact potentially
accounts for most of the observed change.
Of course in many more countries where labor abundance is closer to to the world average,
the eects are insignicant. These tables show, however, than in cases where openness
does have an impact on crime, the predicted size of the eects are economically signicant
and so are likely to be an important contributing or mitigating factor in understanding
the overall change in theft or burglaries.19
5 Robustness
5.1 Crime and inequality
A natural question is whether our our results are consistent with the crime literature
that tend to emphasis inequality. For example Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) nd that rising
inequality in the USA has prevented what would have otherwise been a very large de-
crease in crime. In our model inequality is endogenous { a change in commodity prices
aects both factor returns and the level of expropriation. Hence crime and inequality are
correlated but there is no causal link between inequality and crime.
Nevertheless other factors can also aect inequality, and there may be other links between
19Likewise the results for the quantitative impact of duties on crime give results that are economically
signicant and within reasonable bounds. These additional results are available upon request.
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inequality and crime example, according to Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002),
inequality generates resentment, leading the poor to seek compensation through crime.
Following Fajnzylber et al. (2002), we therefore control for inequality by including either
the Gini coecient, gini, or the ratio of the income earned by the 20% richest on the
income earned by the 20% poorest, henceforth ratio. Due to limited data availability we
use the average gini and the average ratio overall years for which the data have been
collected.
As shown in Tables 3 to 6 (Columns 2 and 3) these two measures of inequality never reach
statistical signicance at the 5% level or lower. Moreover the inclusion of an inequality
measure in the model does not change our main conclusion that an increase in trade
openness leads to an increase in crime in labor abundant countries and a decrease in
crime in capital abundant countries.
5.2 Institutional Dierences
A second potential concern is that institutional dierences across countries will aect the
impact of trade on crime. In particular democratic countries may oer social protection
to those who lose from increasing trade or may allow discontents to be heard in the public
sphere. Democracy is already included in our preceding models, as well as the reporting
rate regression. Nevertheless this argument suggests an interaction between democracy
and changes in the trade regime.20 To test for this we include the multiplicative variable
democi  tradeit into the model.
It can be seen in Column 4 of Tables 3 to 6 that this new variable democi  tradeit
also never reaches statistical signicance. Moreover, we conclude that the total impact
of trade openness on crime is similar in democratic countries (2 + 3 k + 5) and
autocratic countries (2 + 3 k). The inclusion of this term, however, leads to important
loss in statistical signicance while not adding much to the model.
More generally we can consider a xed eects (FE) estimator to hold constant any un-
controlled for determinants of crime across countries. The results for such models are
presented in Column 5 of Tables 3 to 6. As before we conclude that trade liberalization
increases thefts in labor abundant countries but has the opposite eect in capital abun-
dant countries. With respect to burglaries however there is now a lack of signicance.
Despite this however there is still considerable support for the model when using thefts
20In particular Besley and Persson (2008) nd that the impact of commodity prices on conict varies




6.1 Endogeneity of trade policy variables
Clearly endogeneity is important consideration that we have not so far discussed. The
trade policy variables openness and duties may be endogenous and we cannot dismiss the
possibility, for example, that high crime levels deter trade. Hence in this Section we use a
generalized method of moments instrumental-variables (GMM-IV) model to instrument
for open and duties.
Specically, we instrument for openness using two variables: lagged openness and nat-
ural openness, where natural openness is the predicted openness, based solely on the
geographic and historical characteristics of a country. Following Wei (2000) and El-
badawi and Hegre (2008), we estimate a model explaining the ratio of trade over GDP
using, as explanatory variables: a measure of remoteness, the log of the population size,
if the country is landlocked, the ratio of the coastline on the total area of the country, if
the country is an island, if English is an ocial language, if French is an ocial language
and if Spanish is an ocial language. Using this model, we predict the natural open-
ness of the country, that is, the expected ratio of trade over GDP based solely on the
geographic and the historical characteristics of the country. In contrast to the observed
ratio of trade over GDP, natural openness is not expected to be inuenced by the actual
crime rate. Similarly we instrument for duties using its lagged value.
The results are reported in Column 6 of Tables 3 to 6. For all models, we conclude that the
rst stage t is high and that there is always at least one instrument reaching statistical
signicance in the rst stage model.22 For open, as the model is over-identied, we also
perform a test of over-identifying restriction and conclude that the set of instrument
variables is valid. With the Shea partially adjusted R-squared of over 0.3 for all models,
21We report the results for a FE estimation with AR(1) errors rather than clustered errors. The thefts
model performs slightly better with AR(1) errors though the burglaries model performs slights better
with clustering.
22As noted by Cameron and Trivedi (2007), the IV estimator may approach the OLS estimator and
therefore have a similar bias when the rst stage t is high and the number of instruments is very large
relative to the sample size. Therefore, as a robustness check we have estimated the IV model with only
the lag of the endogenous variables. We again conclude that there is no need to instrument. These
results are available on request.
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we are also condent that our instruments are not weak (Shea 1997).23
Nevertheless we also note that, despite the strength of our instrumental variables, we
nd no strong evidence for the need for instruments. The Hausman tests show that
open and open  k are not endogenous in the thefts' and the burglaries' models. The
evidence is weaker for the duties-theft model as the Hausman test is only marginally
insignicant. In any case, the GMM-IV estimator's results are similar to the OLS results
found previously, reinforcing our condence in our base model estimates.
6.2 Endogeneity of crime rates
A second endogeneity issue comes from the crime literature. Specically past crime rates
may aect the current crime rate, since a high crime rate is argued to weaken social capital
(Case and Katz 1991), lower the psychological cost of committing crimes (Rasmusen 1996)
and deter job creation in the legal sector (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996).
These could all potentially lead to a higher crime rate in the future. Moreover, a surge
in crime rates may overwhelm the law-enforcement services, thus decreasing the risk of
apprehension, thus inducing further crime (Sah 1991).
In order to control for the past crime rate, we use an Arellano and Bond (AB) estimator
(Arellano and Bond 1991).24 The results are given in Column 7 of Tables 3 and 4 (thefts)
and Column 7 of Tables 5 and 6 (burglaries). Given the unbalanced structure of our
panel, the use of past values of crime rate as explanatory variable leads to a sharp drop
in the sample size even though we include only one lag. Nonetheless, despite the limited
degrees of freedom, we conclude that more openness and less duties increase theft and
burglary rates in labor abundant countries but have positive or no signicant impact on
capital abundant countries. Interestingly, once other factors are controlled for, past theft
and burglary rates are not found to be statistically signicant.
23Again these additional results are available upon request. We do not perform the Stock and Yogo
(2002) tests as we cannot assume that our standard errors are iid.
24The AB estimator is similar to the rst dierence estimator in the sense that the variation in the
dependent variable is explained by the variation in the explanatory variables. Among those explanatory
variables is the past crime rate. By denition, the variation in lag crime is correlated with ". Arel-




The social costs of trade liberalization are at the core of the debate over the broader eects
of globalization. Contributions such as Rodrik (1997) have given some legitimacy to
skeptics' concerns about the social costs of trade reforms. Likewise Findlay and O'Rourke
(2007) and Williamson (2011) warn that one cannot assume that the path of globalization
will follow a benevolent trend. Other contributions to the debate such as Bhagwati (2004)
and Wolf (2004) also point to the many complex and varied eects of globalization, but
also denounce what they suggest are false alarms from populist media.
Against this background we consider how costly law enforcement and imperfect property
rights modify the standard gain-from-trade propositions. We rst outline a theoretical
model that follows the recent literature on trade and expropriation, particularly Ghosh
and Robertson (2012) and Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011). The model shows that the eects
of trade liberalization on expropriation activities, such as crime: (i) are ambiguous, and;
(ii) dier across countries depending on the sign of the Stolper-Samuelson eects, and
hence on a country's endowments of capital and labor.
We then test this theory using an unbalanced cross-country panel data set of theft and
burglary rates. Across a range of specications, including dierent measures of openness,
we nd substantial evidence in support of that proposition that trade liberalization can
have a large eect on crime rates, and that trade liberalization increases crime rates
in labor abundant countries, and reduces crime, or has no eect, in capital abundant
countries. Moreover we nd that the results are robust when we allow for endogeneity.
Specically we nd that GMM-IV results are similar to our OLS results and we nd little
evidence of endogeneity of the trade policy variables. Likewise we nd no evidence that
current crime rates are aected by past crime rates once other explanatory variables are
controlled for.
The results are consistent with a model where law-enforcement activities are labor inten-
sive relative to crime activities. They oer some support for globalization sceptics, and
suggest very large eects, especially for the most labor abundant countries. But they
also suggest that for the majority of countries, there is either an insignicant or negative
relationship between trade liberalization and crime.
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Appendix A: Derivation of (5)
An individual i's income comes from two sources: productive activities and expropriation.
Consider rst the income from expropriation. If i succeeds in targeting k and is not
detected/convicted by legal authorities then she earns !k. The probabilities of i's
success in targeting k and failure of detection/verication by courts are given by (ei)
and 1   (zk) respectively. As these two events are independent, the probability that i
successfully expropriates !k from k is (ei)(1  (zk)). Since individual i earns zero in
all other cases, an individual i's income from expropriation is
!k; with probability (ei)(1  (zk));
0; with probability 1  (ei)(1  (zk)):
Now consider i's income from productive activities. Given that a fraction !i can be suc-
cessfully expropriated by j with probability (ej)(1 (zi)), i's income from productive
activities is
(1  )!i; with probability (ej)(1  (zi));
!i; with probability 1  (ej)(1  (zi)):
Taking these dierent types of incomes and probabilities into account, and deducting the
expenditures on legal services pzz
i, individual i's expected overall income turns out as in
equation (5) in the text:
yid = !
i(1  (ej)(1  (zi))) + !k(ei)(1  (zk))  pzzi:
Appendix B: Countries Included in the Sample
Reporting rate models : The countries for which the data overlap and for which we have all
useful variables are: Argentina (only thefts), Australia, Austria, Belgium (only burglar-
ies), Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt (only burglaries), Finland,
France, Greece (only burglaries), Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy (only thefts),
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama (only thefts),
Philippines (only thefts), Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland (only burglaries), Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
Crime rate models : Algeria, Argentina (only thefts), Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
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Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia (only burglaries), Fiji, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (only thefts), Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea South, Lesotho (only burglaries), Luxembourg, Malawi
(only thefts), Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal (only thefts), Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama (only thefts), Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines (only thefts), Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad (only
thefts), Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela
(only thefts), Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Appendix C: Denition of Variables
(Table A.1 about here)
Appendix D:
(Table A.2 about here)
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Figure 4: The World Distribution of k
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Denition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
log(rrate) (thefts) Log of Reporting Rate (Thefts). -2.57 1.55 -6.34 -1.00 65
log(rrate) (burglaries) Log of Reporting Rate (Burglaries). -1.88 1.78 -7.06 0.98 63
thefts (original) Log of Ocial Thefts Rate (Per 100,000 Inhabitants, Original). 6.63 1.69 0.12 9.02 240
thefts (corrected) Log of Ocial Thefts Rate (Per 100,000 Inhabitants, Corrected). 9.98 0.90 5.35 12.53 240
burglaries (original) Log of Ocial Burglaries Rate (Per 100,000 Inhabitants, Original). 5.20 2.03 -2.72 7.77 185
burglaries (corrected) Log of Ocial Burglaries Rate (Per 100,000 Inhabitants, Corrected). 7.84 1.41 1.94 10.03 185
gdp Log of Real GDP per Capita (2005, Constant International Dollars). 9.33 0.94 6.90 11.22 240
democ Democracy Dummy. 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 240
ethnic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization. 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.93 240
asia East and Southeast Asia Dummy. 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 240
latin Latin America Dummy. 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 240
SSA Sub-saharan Africa Dummy. 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 240
gdpg Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (2005, Constant International Dollars). 2.24 2.74 -14.92 13.05 240
pop Population (In Millions). 54.42 158.12 0.07 1229.63 240
unemp Unemployment Rate. 8.03 5.17 1.23 34.60 240
k Ratio of Capital per Worker on World Average Capital per Worker in 1970. 0.19 1.19 -3.66 1.94 240
open Log of Trade as Percentage of GDP. 4.16 0.55 2.62 6.10 240
duties Log of Duties as Percentage of GDP. -3.95 1.42 -9.87 -0.81 155
Table 2: Reporting Rate
Thefts Burglaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gdp 2.4173*** 1.4579*** 0.9448*** 1.7665** 1.4787*** 0.8314**





















Constant -23.0298*** -16.7319*** -11.8390*** -23.0012*** -16.3431*** -10.3727***
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0093)
Observations 23 65 65 21 63 63
R  squared 0.8002 0.7164 0.8972 0.7232 0.5587 0.6904































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Predicted Impacts on Theft due to Changes in Openness
Country Period Increase in Increase in Predicted Increase
Openness (%) Theft (%) in Theft (%)
Thailand 1982-2007 109.1 -38.6 22.1
Bangladesh 1982-2007 78.2 -112.1 49.8
Philippines 1982-2007 58.1 -160.0 10.1
China 1982-1997 55.6 -30.1 28.8
Luxembourg 1987-2007 44.0 -131.5 -25.8
Syria 1987-1992 40.6 4.4 16.7
Turkey 1987-2007 39.3 107.4 6.5
Morocco 1992-2007 33.9 -25.0 5.6
Switzerland 1992-2007 32.2 -47.1 -15.8
Sri Lanka 1987-2002 25.4 -24.9 6.1
Netherlands 1982-2007 22.2 -54.2 -10.3
Iceland 1997-2007 10.9 -45.7 -5.0
Malaysia 1982-1987 6.9 -14.1 1.2
Norway 1982-2007 -4.6 -38.7 2.4
Seychelles 1982-1992 -9.9 -24.3 -2.8
Pakistan 1982-2002 -12.4 -44.4 -3.6
Indonesia 1982-1987 -16.4 -58.8 -8.7
Barbados 1982-2002 -24.0 21.3 11.0
Egypt 1982-1987 -39.9 -7.4 -14.0
Table 8: Predicted Impacts on Burglaries due to Changes in Openness
Country Period Increase in Increase in Predicted Increase
Openness (%) Burglaries (%) in Burglaries (%)
Thailand 1987-2002 76.2 -180.9 65.9
Malaysia 1987-2007 58.4 -96.5 46.0
China 1987-2002 52.5 -3.9 90.0
South Korea 1992-2007 45.1 85.8 26.1
Syria 1987-1992 40.6 -14.0 58.0
Romania 1992-2007 38.9 -80.8 24.1
Egypt 1987-2007 38.3 -45.4 48.5
Switzerland 1992-2007 32.2 -40.9 -32.4
Sri Lanka 1987-2002 25.4 -8.1 24.4
Netherlands 1997-2007 15.4 -54.4 -14.4
Luxembourg 2002-2007 11.9 -17.8 -15.1
Iceland 1997-2007 10.9 -33.3 -10.1
Jordan 1987-1997 9.3 -5.9 6.5
El Salvador 2002-2007 7.4 -417.2 3.4
Colombia 1992-2002 7.2 -64.6 3.1
Norway 1987-2007 4.5 -73.6 -4.9
Turkey 2002-2007 3.7 47.4 2.8
Barbados 1987-2002 1.4 57.2 -1.3
Seychelles 1987-1992 -3.4 6.3 -3.7
Zambia 1992-2002 -3.8 -43.9 -1.8
Pakistan 1997-2002 -15.5 -20.7 -17.0





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Full Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Thefts Burglaries
Open Duties Open Duties
gdp -0.1894 -0.2776 -0.2240 -0.0655
(0.2300) (0.1820) (0.4500) (0.83500
democ 0.0339 0.3493 0.1091 0.2736
(0.8770) (0.1900) (0.7650) (0.4320)
ethnic 0.8089** 0.3685 1.2815** 0.7736
(0.0130) (0.3650) (0.0210) (0.1470)
asia 0.7023** 1.0299** 0.9465 1.0842**
(0.0150) (0.0110) (0.1050) (0.0190)
latin 0.8046*** 0.9352*** 0.3170 -0.1807
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.5790) (0.6300)
SSA 0.7400** 1.3305*** 0.9201 1.4347***
(0.0280) (0.0030) (0.1440) (0.0030)
ggdp -0.0319* -0.1054*** -0.0245 -0.0767
(0.0680) (0.0010) (0.4850) (0.2050)
pop -0.0034** -0.0025 -0.0057** -0.0046*
(0.0180) (0.1220) (0.0350) (0.0880)
pop2 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000**
(0.0010) (0.0200) (0.0010) (0.0170)
unemp 0.0032 0.0166 0.0373* 0.0560**
(0.7490) (0.2040) (0.0620) (0.0220)
k 1.4930*** 0.7977*** 3.3802*** 1.1327***





open k -0.2546*** -0.6870***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
duties k 0.1117** 0.2226**
(0.0250) (0.0140)
cons 11.5772*** 11.6105*** 8.7095*** 7.5598***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0070)
Observations 240 155 185 138
